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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the number of states or regional units the 
Philippine should have when it will federalize the country must be 
limited to 5. This claim meets the Samuelsonian principle of welfare 
theorem where marginal social cost is equal to marginal social 
benefit.  
 
The paper also argues that the states or regional governments 
should have the limited to earn revenue through taxing powers 
which will be used to spend for government operations. In this 
manner, efficiency is achieved and control of the federal 
government on the affairs of the states and regional governments is 
limited primarily to transfers through equalization parameters.  
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Introduction 
The complexity in the determination of the number of states in a Federal Philippines lies on 
determining what is socially optimal. It is determining the number of powers and the fund 
requirement to operate the public services assigned to it. Thus, it is on the powers to be 
distributed to the levels of government and on how to fund the services that will be 
handled by the states and their local governments.  
Assignment of powers 
Among political scientists, the debates on the number of states drift from five (5) states, 
seven (7) states, to twelve (12) states. The determination of the powers, both governance 
and fiscal, at times describe only the surface of dynamic political theories and pragmatic 
approaches derived from literatures. Here, let me contribute by infusing the economics of 
federalism. This is to breathe economics view on the federalization process. Again, at the 
end of the day, it is economics.  
First, let me share the principles used in assigning powers to the tiers of government. The 
tiers of government are the federal, state and local governments. These tiers maintain 
exclusive, primary and concurrent powers. 
The first principle in assigning power is on the control on the geographic area that would 
internalize the benefits and costs of providing a public service. These are those powers 
which Oates (1972) and Tiebot (1956) describe as the proximity criteria of the government 
to its citizens, and these powers must be assigned to the State such as education, social 
services, public safety. 
Suppose that the public good requires technology and the nature of the public service is 
private and rival, this power will be assigned to the state. An example of this is welfare 
services. When a welfare service is provided, the service becomes ‘private rival’ goods 
which means that a consumption of it will deny somebody else to use it. Quigley (1997) 
assigns this power primarily to the state upon support of the federal because there is a 
compensating variation on the welfare of the citizens.  
Using the Hicksian principle (Hicks, 1943; Chipman & Moore, 1980) , citizens will be 
subsidized in order to achieve the same benefits after the change in the provision of 
service. Likewise, those who prefer the old service before need to pay for an amount, this is 
called equivalent variation. Example of this is a government hospital. Those who need most 
of the services will need to consume the optimal quantity of medical service, which is lower 
than private service. Those who wanted to enjoy the medical service better than the 
average provision need to pay higher.   
Another criterion that is useful in determining assignment of power as set forth by Ribstein 
and Kobayashi (2006) is the exclusivity principle of consumption being limited by 
geography. If a public service is enjoyed by a limited geography such as street 
infrastructure, education, local fire protection, then these must be left to the state 
government. Other economists who studied federalism like Bardhan (2006) who studied 
the Indian federalism, University of Maryland Professor Wallace Oates, and the Scottish 
economists Mcdonald & Hallwood (2004) agree that community-specific goods be given to 
the state. 
Suppose that the public goods being provided have spillover costs or even benefits across 
locations Chandra (2012) suggested that this must be assigned to the federal government 
given their federalism experience in India. An example of public service with spillover 
effects is pollution or export processing zones for job creation. Also, if the provision of the 
public goods has presence of free-rider, then that power must be assigned to the federal 
government. A free-rider in economics happens when those who benefit from the 
resources do not pay for it (in the form of tax). If the public goods are consumed by varied 
population, this has to be assigned to be with the federal government.  
When production cost is zero for additional unit of public good, then it is better be left to 
the federal government. This means that an additional benefit afforded to another citizen 
accrues zero marginal cost such as provision of national defense, Berkely law professor 
Daniel Rubinfield and University of Pennsylvania Robert Inman (1997) qualify the 
superiority of federal government in providing these types of services. 
Then given these criteria, there is no doubt that the state and local governments will have 
more powers than the federal government. The government is pulled nearer to the citizens. 
Primarily, these are the powers like education, health care, police, public works, public 
utilities (limited to distribution; generation will be with the federal), labor relations, 
dwellings, natural resources, land transportation, courts (there are also federal courts), 
trade and industry (inter-state commerce will be within the powers of federal), ancestral 
rights and cultural services, the local government. These are just few samples of the list, but 
for the purpose of simplicity, we will limit it with these powers to be consistent with 
comparable budget portfolio of the 2017 budget. 
 
 
Budget requirement and number of states/regional units in proposed Federal 
Philippines 
An initial computation based on the 2017 budget, the operational costs will be 2.122 
trillion. In a five federal states, each state will operate on P424.51 billion; 7 states will 
operate with P303.22 billion and 12 states will have P176.88 billion to use. This is an 
accumulated budget; we could dig deeper to the level of population for each state in the 
proposed number of states. But then again, a huge government budget is always a desired 
condition. Having more states will mean smaller budget. We cannot make a design of 
government that will fail. We can make, in the initial three (3) lead states, and then add two 
(2) more by 2022, if it warrants by income then add two more by 2028. However, this 
country can only limit itself up to seven (7) states. Beyond this number will become socially 
inefficient, a condition where the Samuelsonian (1954, 1955) principle of the marginal 
social benefits is equal to the marginal social cost is not met. Simply saying, the ability of 
the government in providing the public services is higher than the revenue ability of the 
government to fund these services.  
References 
Bardhan, P. (2006). Decentralization and development. Handbook of fiscal federalism. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 201-223. 
Chipman, J. S., & Moore, J. C. (1980). Compensating variation, consumer's surplus, and 
welfare. The American Economic Review, 933-949. 
Hicks, J. R. (1943). The four consumer's surpluses. The review of economic studies, 11(1), 
31-41. 
Inman, R. P., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1997). Rethinking federalism. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 11(4), 43-64. 
MacDonald, R., & Hallwood, P. (2004). The economic case for fiscal federalism in Scotland. 
Quigley, J. M. (1997). Fiscal federalism and economic development: A theoretical overview. 
In Government for the Future (pp. 83-101). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal federalism. Books. 
Prakash Chandra, J. (2012). Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Analysis. 
Ribstein, Larry E., and Bruce H. Kobayashi. "The economics of federalism." University of 
Illinois Legal Working Paper Series (2006): 49. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. The review of economics 
and statistics, 387-389. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1955). Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure. The 
review of economics and statistics, 350-356. 
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of political 
economy, 64(5), 416-424. 
 
